

George Apostolakis Head, Nuclear Risk Research Center <u>apostola@mit.edu</u>

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The Traditional Approach

Prior to Risk Assessment


- Management of (unquantified at the time) uncertainty was always a concern.
- Defense-in-depth and safety margins became embedded in the regulations.
- "Defense-in-Depth is an element of the NRC's safety philosophy that employs successive compensatory measures to prevent accidents or mitigate damage if a malfunction, accident, or naturally caused event occurs at a nuclear facility." [USNRC White Paper, February, 1999]




Problems with the Traditional Approach


- There is no guidance as to how much defense in depth is sufficient
- DBAs use qualitative approaches for ensuring system reliability (the single-failure criterion) when more modern quantitative approaches exist
- DBAs use stylized considerations of human performance (e.g., operators are assumed to take no action within, for example, 30 minutes of an accident's initiation)
- DBAs do not reflect operating experience and modern understanding
- Industry-sponsored PRAs showed a variability in risk of plants that were licensed under the same regulations.













Acceptance Guidelines for Core Damage Frequency








PRA Adequacy

- A full-scope PRA includes all operating modes, internal and external initiating events and estimates of the core damage frequency, large early release frequency, release categories, and health effects
- Most regulatory decisions utilize Level 1 PRAs and Large Early Release Frequency
- Many regulatory decisions do not require a fullscope Level 1 PRA
- The level of detail of the PRA is determined by its intended use





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Regulatory Guidance

USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.200, "AN APPROACH FOR DETERMINING THE TECHNICAL ADEQUACY OF PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT RESULTS FOR RISK-INFORMED ACTIVITIES"

- Scope of a PRA
- Fechnical elements of a full-scope Level 1 and Level 2 PRA and their associated attributes and characteristics
- Level of detail of a PRA
- > Development, maintenance, and upgrade of a PRA
- The documentation must be sufficient to facilitate independent peer reviews



Peer Review

• Qualifications of the experts

- independent with no conflicts of interest (i.e., have not performed any work on the PRA)
- collectively represent expertise in all the technical elements of a PRA including integration
- > expertise in the technical element assigned to review
- knowledge of the plant design and operation
- knowledge of the peer review process

Guidance for reviews

- NEI 00-02, "Probabilistic Risk Assessment Peer Review Process Guidance."
- NEI 05-04, "Process for Performing Follow-On PRA Peer Reviews Using the ASME PRA Standard."
- NEI 07-12, "Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (FPRA) Peer Review Process Guidelines."


PRA Standards

• "The peer review is to be performed against established standards" (RG 1.200)

• Examples

- ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Addenda to ASME/ANS RA-S-2008 Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications,"
- ASME/ANS RA-S-1.4-2013: Probabilistic Risk Assessment Standard for Advanced Non-LWR Nuclear Power Plants (for trial use)
- **Concern about stifling methodological progress**





Example: Initiating Events

- HLR-IE-A The initiating event analysis shall provide a reasonably complete identification of initiating events.
- Supporting Requirements
 - IE-A2 INCLUDE in the spectrum of internal-event challenges considered at least the following general categories: transients, LOCAs, SGTR, ISLOCAs, support system failures
 - IE-A4 REVIEW generic analyses and operating experience of similar plants to assess whether the list of challenges included in the model accounts for industry operating experience

